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Abstract
This paper presents evidence that incorporating costly thought, modelled with rational inattention, might
solves three well-established puzzles in the retirement literature. The first puzzle is that, given incentives,
the extent of bunching of labour market exits at legislated state pension ages (SPA) seems incompatible with
rational expectations (e.g. Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow, 2016). Adding to the evidence for this puzzle, this
paper includes an empirical analysis focusing on whether liquidity constraints can account for this bunching
and find they cannot. The nature of this puzzle is clarified by exploring a life-cycle model with rational agents
that does match aggregate profiles. This model succeeds in matching these aggregates only by overestimating
the impact of the SPA on poorer individuals whilst underestimating its impact on wealthier people. The second
puzzle is that people are often mistaken about their own pension provisions (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier,
2001). Concerning this second puzzle, I incorporate rational inattention to the SPA into the aforementioned
life-cycle model, thus allowing for mistaken beliefs. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first
not only to incorporate rational inattention into a life-cycle model but also to assess a rationally inattentive
model against non-experimental individual choice data. This facilitates another important contribution to the
rational attention literature: discipling the cost of attention with subjective expectations data. Preliminary
results indicate rational inattention can not only improve the aggregate fit to the data but better matches
the response of participation to the SPA across the wealth distribution, hence offering a resolution to the first
puzzle. The third puzzle is that despite more than actuarially fair options to defer receipt of pension benefits
in some countries, take up is extremely low (e.g. Shoven and Slavov, 2014). A simple extension of the main
model generates, by extending the source of uncertainty and including a claiming decision, an explanation of
this last puzzle: the actuarial calculations implying deferral being preferable ignore the utility cost of paying
attention to your pension which can be avoided by claiming. This paper researches these puzzles in the
context of the ongoing reform to the UK female state pension age.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the rationality of retirement decisions and whether allowing for the costly nature of thought
explains observed regularities better than the status quo which abstract away from these costs. In particular,
it focus on three puzzles for a rational expectations (RE) explanation of retirement choices. Firstly, that it is
difficult to reconcile the large number of labour market exits at legislated pension entitlement ages with RE.
Secondly, that individuals are frequently mistaken about their own retirement provisions. Thirdly, despite more
than actuarially fair pension deferral incentives, deferral rates are very low. I find that acknowledging costly
thought accommodates the second puzzle whilst generating mechanisms that helps explain the first and third.
Ageing populations have forced many governments to increase the state pension age. These reforms revealed
the first puzzle: labour market exits are more sensitive to legislated state pension ages than RE can accommodate
given the limited incentives to retire exactly at these ages (Behaghel, and Blau, 2012; Cribb, Emmerson, and
Tetlow, 2016; Seibold, 2017; Lalive, Magesan and Staubli, 2017). This paper contributes to the evidence for this
puzzle, within the context of the ongoing reform to the UK female state pension age (SPA), by studying the
dependence of the response to the SPA on asset holdings. I find an indistinguishable participation response to
the SPA across the wealth distribution largely ruling out liquidity constraints as a RE consistent explanation of
this puzzle.
This claimed oversensitivity is in tension with studies that successfully match observed retirement decisions
without abandoning RE (French, 2005; French and Jones, 2011; O’Dea, 2018), although these are not studies
of a pension reform. One contribution of this paper is to offer a resolution of this tension. This is achieved by
investigating whether a RE model that successfully matches aggregate labour market profiles around SPA also
matches the response to changes in the SPA across the wealth distribution. The model succeeds in matching the
aggregates only by exaggerating the response to the SPA amongst the bottom half of the wealth distribution
whilst shrinking the response amongst the top half.
The second puzzling regularity at odds with RE is that individuals are frequently mistaken about their
pension provision (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; Rohwedder and Kleinjans, 2006; Crawford and Tetlow, 2010;
Amin-Smith and Crawford, 2018). Traditionally life-cycle models treat institutional factors like the SPA as static
parameters known, without cost, by everyone; an approach which precludes any explanation of why people are
systematically mistaken. By acknowledging the stochasticity of government pension policy and incorporating
costly thought, this paper attempts to explain this observed ignorance. Costly thought is modelled using rational
inattention (RI), an approach that includes a utility cost of information acquisition.
Allowing for these incorrect beliefs explains the bunching of labour market exits with greater success than
the RE benchmark model. The mechanism behind this result is as follows: rational inattention to the SPA
introduces additional uncertainty implying greater precautionary saving which leads to greater labour market
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participation. As this uncertainty is resolved upon reaching SPA, this induces bunching of labour market exit
at the SPA. This mechanism is not strictly dependent on rational inattention and exist with the introduction
of a stochastic SPA alone. However, for reasonable levels of stochasticity that match how the government has
historically reformed the SPA, I find that the amplification of uncertainty inherent in rational inattention is
required to produce a discernible difference from the RE benchmark.
The third puzzle for a RE explanation of retirement behaviour is that despite clear incentives to defer in both
the UK and USA, deferral is very uncommon in both countries (Shoven and Slavov, 2012; Shoven and Slavov,
2014; Crawford and Tetlow, 2010). The calculation implying than deferral is more than actuarially fair do not,
however, take account of the attention cost of tracking pension entitlements. Once we allow for costly attention
claiming immediately can be optimal as claiming removes one demand on our limited attention: tracking pension
entitlements. I present an extension to my main model with that includes a mechanism capable of generating
such results.
The reform to the UK female SPA provides me with the opportunity to investigate these question. This
reform has a staggered implementation which creates individual level variation in SPAs allowing the effect of
the SPA on employment to be identified separately from effects of ageing. Additionally, the UK institutional
context has two features advantageous to identifying motivations behind retirement decisions. Firstly, receipt
of the UK state pension is not conditional on employment status and only provides an incentive to retire for
liquidity constrained individuals. Secondly, forcing someone to retire purely due to age is illegal, ruling out firm
mandated retirement as an explanation for the bunching of labour market exits. The dataset I will use is the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) which is a detailed panel survey of older individual.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I review the literature and, in section 3, I
outline the institutional context and the data used. In section 4, I present evidence of the three puzzles in my
dataset focusing on the first puzzle that bunching of labour market exits at SPA cannot be explained with RE.
In particular, as liquidity constraints are the main explanation proposed within an RE approach, I investigate
whether liquidity constraints can explain this bunching and find indications they cannot. To see if some RE
compatible mechanism might explain the bunching, in section 5, I take a version of a recent rich structural
model (O’Dea, 2018) that matches aggregate profile and investigates its mechanisms. I find that it matches
the aggregate bunching of labour market exits at SPA only by exaggerating the response of those nearer the
borrowing constraints and underestimating the response of those much further from it. This model then serves
as a baseline into which I incorporate rational inattention in section 6. This rational inattention to the SPA
mechanically explains the second puzzle but in section 5 I present preliminary result from a calibrated version
of the model that the introduction of RI better approximates the response to the SPA across the distribution
thus offering a explanation of the first puzzle. In section 7 I present an extension that increases the source of
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uncertainty that demand agents attention and introduces a claiming decision and argue that this generates a
mechanism that can help explain the third puzzle. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literatures identifying the three puzzles mentioned earlier by proposing a solution
to them. This solution brings together two disparate literatures, on rational inattention and on quantitative
retirement models, hence additionally making a contribution to each of these. In bringing these two literatures
together this paper is the first work, to the best of the author’s knowledge, to apply rational inattention to
non-experimental individual choice data. This work can also be more broadly construed as part of the growing
literatures on behavioural public economics or the economic implications of attention.
The first puzzle is that labour market participation appears more sensitive to SPA than Rational Expectations
(RE) predicts given the incentives. It has long been known that labour force participation responds strongly
to the eligibility ages of social security programs. Gruber and Wise (2004) survey evidence from 11 developed
countries and find labour force exits concentrated around legislated retirement ages. The response of labour
market participation to reforms in the social security eligibility ages has been widely studied (Staubli and
Zweimuller, 2013; Manoli and Weber, 2012; Atalay and Barrett, 2015). Often this literature has focused on
estimating elasticities and fiscal impacts; however, recently a group of studies has argued that RE is unable to
match the magnitude of labour market exits at legislated pension ages which is the principal puzzle this paper
attempts to explain (Behaghel, and Blau, 2012; Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow, 2016; Seibold, 2017; Lalive,
Magesan and Staubli, 2017). Lalive et al. (2017) study a Swiss reform that increased women’s full retirement
age (FRA), the age they can claim their full pension, and introduced an Early Retirement Age (ERA), the
earliest eligibility age to a reduced pension. They find, whilst incentives encourage most women to claim early,
most delay. Seibold (2017) studies retirement in Germany where there exists an ERA, a FRA, and a NRA
(normal retirement ages, a purely nominal age), along with multiple pathways into retirement; this arrangement
creates over 600 kinks and notches in life-time budget constraints. These non-differentiabilities can be classified
into statutory retirement ages where some expectation of retirement exists (i.e. ERA, FRA and NRA) and
pure financial incentives. Siebold (2017) documents that the bunching of labour market exits is higher at the
non-differentiability associated with a statutory retirement age rather than those only associated with a financial
incentive and interprets this as evidence for reference dependent preference. Both Seibold (2017) and Lalive et
al. (2017) present structural model that attempt to explain these findings. Cribb et al. (2016) study the same
increase to the UK female SPA as this paper. Since the UK state pension age is the earliest that the pension
can be claimed it is an ERA for international comparison. They produce reduced form estimates of the impact
of reaching ERA on labour force participation and, although their paper is purely empirical, argue that their
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findings are difficult to explain with RE. As I borrow from and build on the methodology of Cribb et al. (2016)
their methods are discussed in more detail in section 4.
The second puzzle, that people hold mistaken beliefs about their own pension provision, goes back to at least
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001). They compare reported expected benefits to objective calculations based on
social security records and employer provided pension description and find misinformation the norm. Rohwedder
and Kleinjans (2006) study the dynamics of these mistaken beliefs and find that their expectations become
increasingly accurate as individuals approach retirement. Finally, Crawford and Tetlow (2010) look at women
subject to the UK female SPA reform and find they hold substantially incorrect beliefs about their own SPA
and Amin-Smith and Crawford (2018) update this analysis finding broadly similar results. An advantage of the
structural model presented here over those of Seibold (2017) and Lalive et al. (2017) is that it accommodates
both the fact people hold incorrect beliefs and that labour market exits bunch at SPA. I also rely on a different
mechanism, rational inattention to the SPA, rather than reference dependent preferences (Seibold, 2018) or
controlling the proportion of agents being unable to choose when to retire (Lalive et al., 2017).
The literature on the third puzzle is, to the best of my knowledge, more recent. This is because what
constitutes an actuarially favourable pension deferral is dependent on mortality probabilities and interest rates.
Shoven and Slavov (2014) look at the US and find that although whether deferral was beneficial or not in the 1960s
was dependent on family status, by the 21st century deferral was preferable for nearly all the groups considered.
This change can be attributed to increased life-expectancy and historically low interest rates. Shoven and Slavov
(2012) extend this analysis to look at optimal deferral choices for individuals allowing for heterogeneous survival
probabilities and find that most households – even those with mortality rates that are twice the average – benefit
from some delay. Despite these strong incentives to defer, these paper find in the US most individuals appear
to claim Social Security soon after they reach the eligibility threshold age. This same puzzle has been observed
in the UK context that I study. Crawford and Tetlow (2010) find that only ≈2% take up this option to defer
receipt of the state pension, despite it being more than actuarially fair.
Addressing these puzzles this paper brings together two disparate literatures, one being on rational inatten-
tion (RI). RI was developed by Sims in a series of paper (1998; 2003; 2006) and originally found application
to macroeconomic problems, exemplified by Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2015) use of RI to explain differential
business cycle response to shocks and the explanation of sticky prices in Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009),
although recently its domain of application has expanded. For example, in a decision theory context, Caplin
and Dean (2015) develop a revealed preference test that characterizes all patterns of choice "mistakes" consistent
with a generalisation of RI. Ravid (2018) applies RI in a game theory context; Bartoš et al. (2016) apply RI to
explain job market discrimination in a field experiment; Matejka and McKay (2014) and Steiner, Stewart, and
Matejka (2017) prove results linking RI to logit model of choice. This paper contributes to this expansion of the
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domain of application of RI by applying it to a life-cycle model of saving and labour supply. In doing so it is
the first work, to the best of my knowledge, to apply rational inattention to non-experimental individual choice
data. To achieve this I make extensive use of the theoretical advance made by Steiner, Stewart, and Matejka
(2017) who solve a general class of dynamic discrete choice problems.
The second literature this paper makes a sustainable contribution to is that on quantitative retirement
models. Early work in this literature, such as Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Burtless (1986), abstracted
away from uncertainty and borrowing constraint but more recent work take these into account. French (2005)
estimate a model that allows for dynamics, health transitions and fixed costs of work to explain the retirement
phenomena and French and Jones (2011) allow for medicare cost and greater individual heterogeneity. The paper
from this literature most closely related to the current one is O’Dea (2018) who estimates a structural retirement
model in the UK context to investigate the differing pension provision policies. As well as contributing to this
literature by integrating new modelling techniques from RI, this paper is also contribute to this literature by
comparing the predictions of these model to the ex-post data from a pension age reform.
More broadly this paper fits into the behavioural public economics literature and the growing literature
on attention. This paper speak to the call in Gabaix (2019) for more structural estimation in the attention
literature.
3 Data and Institutional Context
The context for this research project is the UK reform to the female state pension age (SPA). The Pensions
Act 1995 legislated for the female SPA to rise gradually from 60 to 65 over the ten years from April 2010,
rising by one month every two months, reaching age 65 by April 2020. The Pension Act 2011 accelerated the
rate of change of the female SPA from April 2016 so that it equalises with men’s at 65 by November 2018. It
additionally legislated an increase to both the male and female SPA to 66 years phased in between December
2018 to October 2020. Figure 1 from Cribb et al. (2016) summarises how these changes affect women in different
birth cohorts.
An advantage of studying the UK reform is that UK law prohibits firms compulsorily retiring people based
on age, so this cannot explain the bunching of labour market exits at SPA. Another advantage of the UK context
is the state pension is not conditional on employment status and does not provide major tax incentive to exit
from the labour market at this age (Cribb et al., 2016). Together this removes financial incentives to retire
at the SPA for all but the liquidity constrained. A disadvantage with the UK reform is the UK has a single
retirement age at which pension benefits are claimed. This makes it difficult to rule out liquidity constraints
driving the bunching of retirement at SPA, as the ability to borrow against future pension benefits is severely
limited. Cribb et al. (2016) argue against credit constraints being the primary driver on the basis that, whilst
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Figure 1: SPA as a Function of Date of Birth for Women in the UK
homeowners are less likely to be liquidity constrained than renters, the effects of SPA on their labour market
participation are indistinguishable. Homeownership, however, is a coarse measure of wealth and equity in one’s
own home is an illiquid asset. To investigate the role liquidity constraints play, in section 4, I repeat the analysis
of Cribb et al. (2016) on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) dataset which contains detailed
asset holding information this allows me to control more precisely for assets.
ELSA is the principal dataset used it this investigation. It is a panel dataset at a biennial frequency containing
a representative sample of the English private household population aged 50 and over modelled on the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) in the USA. ELSA contains detailed data on: labour market circumstances,
earnings, and the amount and composition of asset holdings. The first wave of ELSA after the start of the initial
implementation of the female SPA reform was wave 5 which covered 2010/11 and I use all waves of ELSA from
wave 1 (2002/03) thought to wave 7 (2014/15).
4 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section I present reduced form evidence motivating the structural model. In section 4.1 I present reduced
form evidence on the first puzzle. Section 4.1 is detailed as I contribute to the literature establishing the existence
of a puzzle by focusing the analysis on the ability of liquidity constraints to explain away this puzzle in the UK
context and find this explanation fall short. In section 4.2, I present some evidence for puzzles two and three.
Section 4.2 is shorter as I simply document the nature of the puzzle and their presence in my data.
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4.1 First Puzzle
The reduced form analysis presented in this section builds on Cribb et al. (2016) study the impact of the
UK female SPA reform on labour market participation. They regress probability of participation (yit) on: an
indicator of being below the SPA; a full set of age, and year of birth dummies; and a vector of controls leading
to the following specification:
P (yit = 1) = α1[ageit ≤ ERAit] +
K∑
c=1
γc1[Y OBi = c] +
A∑
a=1
δa1[ageit = a] +Xitβ + it (1)
They interpret the parameter α as a difference-in-difference estimator of the effect of the treatment of
being below the SPA and find a statistically significant increase in the probability of being employed from the
treatment. They estimate this equation as both a linear probability model and as a probit model with error
clustered at the level of the individual. As mentioned, they argue that liquidity constraints cannot explain the
treatment effect α because a similar size effect is observed for home-owners and renters. Here I repeat their
analysis using ELSA which allows me to more control carefully for assets.
I first present results of estimating equation 1 as a random effect linear probability model with errors
clustered at the level of the individual. I use a random effect specification because the small sample size
means controlling for both autocorrelation and heteroskedascitiy by clustering and arbitrary fixed effect leads
to imprecise estimates. The random effects assumption was tested with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on the
treatment effect and the null, of no difference between the random effect and fixed effects coefficients, was not
rejected. For those uncomfortable with the random effects assumption I also repeat and present all regression
as fixed effects regression with clustered standard errors. Finally, as linear probability models have many
well know flaws, I repeat the analysis presented here with a random effects probit specification model with
clustered standard errors. The full list of controls used is: a full set of marriage status, years of eduction,
education qualifications, and self reported health dummies; partners age; partners age squared; the aggregate
unemployment rate during the quarter of interview; dummies for partner eligible for SPA, and for being one
and two years above and below SPA; and assets of household according to one of the two specification discussed
below.
Obviously, the households whose retirement decisions are least likely to be affected by liquidity constraints
are those with substantial liquidity assets. I consider two categories of assets which are the two most liquid
categories in Carrol and Samwick (1996). Firstly, I look at very liquid assets (VLA) which cover any assets that
could be liquidated almost immediately. This includes bank account balances, money market funds, certificates
of deposit, government savings bonds, mutual funds, and publicly traded stocks. Secondly, I consider non-
housing, non-business wealth (NHNBW) which consist of VLA + all other assets and liabilities not related to
the primary residence or personally owned businesses; these have in common that the household could liquidate
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Table 1: Treatment Effect different subpopulations: Random Effects Model
Population Observations People Treatment Effect P>|z| 95%CI
Whole Population 5,710 2,882 0.101 (0.0312) 0.001 [0.0402,0.1623]
NHNBW > Median 2,573 1,154 0.099 (0.0441) 0.025 [0.0125,0.1855]
VLA > Median 2,563 1,155 0.084 (0.0443) 0.059 [-0.0033,0.1702]
LC Classification 1 NHNBW 4,750 2,384 0.077 (0.0347) 0.027 [0.0085,0.1446]
LC Classification 1 VLA 4,723 2,372 0.077 (0.0348) 0.027 [0.0086,0.1454]
LC Classification 2 NHNBW 2,871 1,260 0.106 (0.0422) 0.012 [0.0234,0.1890]
LC Classification 2 VLA 2,842 1,251 0.101 (0.0423) 0.017 [0.0176,0.1836]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 2,539 1,139 0.100 (0.0443) 0.025 [0.0125,0.1865]
LC Classification 3 VLA 2,557 1,153 0.084 (0.0444) 0.057 [-0.0025,0.1714]
them without losing their home or primary income.
Table 1 contains the results of regressing equation 1 as a random effect linear probability model with errors
clustered at the level of the individual. Row 1 of the table shows the results of running this regression for the
whole population. Rows 2 show the results of running the regression on the subpopulations who have more
than the median assets, taken over the whole sample, in the interview immediately before their SPA using
the NHNBW asset category. Row 3 does the same for the the VLA asset categories. The treatment effect is
significant at the 5% level for the whole population and for the population restricted to having above median
NHNBW. For the population restricted by VLA the treatment effect is only significant at the 10% level. The
size of the treatment effects also does not appear to vary much between the groups. For table 2, rows 1 and 2, I
rigorously test whether there is a significant difference between the treatment effects of the two groups by adding
an interaction term to equation 1 and testing its coefficients. As can be seen, there is no significant difference at
any reasonable level. These results contrasts with the predictions of a liquidity constraint explanation for the
bunching of labour market exits at SPA.
However, we cannot tell a priori how far up the wealth distribution liquidity constraints affect choices.
For this reason, I construct three additional classifications of whether an individual is liquidity constrained each
addressing this issue in distinction ways. The first classification considers an individual to be liquidity constrained
if they are from a household without assets greater or equivalent to the total of their wage from their interview
until their SPA. This classification, however, takes no account of exogenous risk or precautionary saving. The
second classification takes account of the precautionary saving motive. It classifies an individual as liquidity
constrained if their household has insufficient assets to cover their wage plus the level of asset decumulation at
the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution of changes in asset between the periods covering their SPA. The
idea behind this classification is that this amount of asset decumulation represent a measure of the exogenous
risk a household faces at this point in their life-cycle. However, as both of these classifications select on wages
when labour force participation is the dependent variable, they produce biased estimates. As people without a
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Table 2: Differences in Treatment Effects: Random Effect Model
Baseline Treatment Effect Interaction P>|z| (Interaction) 95%CI (Interaction)
NHNBW > Median 0.103 (0.0332) -0.004 (0.0194) 0.852 [-0.0417,0.0344]
VLA > Median 0.109 (0.0332) -0.013 (0.0194) 0.500 [-0.0512,0.0250]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 0.102 (0.0331) -0.001 (0.0194) 0.963 [-0.0389,0.0371]
LC Classification 3 VLA 0.109 (0.0332) -0.013 (0.0194) 0.502 [-0.0511,0.0250]
Continuous Interaction NHNBW 0.110 (0.0314) -8.05e-08 (3.18e-08) 0.011 [-1.43e-07,-1.83e-08]
Continuous Interaction VLA 0.109 (0.0314) -8.18e-08 (3.22e-08) 0.011 [-1.45e-07,-1.86e-08]
job before SPA are less likely to be excluded, the estimates are biased downwards. As I still find a significant
treatment effect despite this bias, it is not as large an issue as it would first seem. I still, however, consider a
third classification which does not select on wages: having sufficient assets to cover decumulation at the bottom
15th percentile of the distribution of changes in asset between the periods covering their SPA. Rows 4-9 of table
1 show the results of regressing equation 1 excluding liquidity constrained individuals; each row corresponds to
a different combination of classifications and asset categories. As can been seen all treatment effects are positive
and significant at the 5% level bar one which is significant at 10% level. The magnitudes are also little changed
between subpopulation giving little indication that liquidity constraints even form part of the explanation of the
observed effect of the SPA on labour force participation.
In rows 3 and 4 of table 2, I test the difference between the whole population and those classed as liquidity
constrained according to classification 3 above. There is no statistically significant difference for either grouping.
I do not test the difference in treatment effect for the first two classification of liquidity constrained individuals
because as mentioned selecting based on these two classification introduces selection bias and so the difference
is not interpretable. The final two rows test the significance of a continuous interaction term for the two asset
categorisations. For both of them the interaction term is negative and significant indicating that having more
assets decrease the impact of being below SPA on the probability of being in work. However, the magnitude of
the effect is tiny implying only a 50% reduction of the treatment effect to ≈ 5% for someone at the 99th percentile
of the wealth distribution according to NHNBW assets. With this tiny change in the treatment effect due to
increased assets it is hard to argue that the treatment effect is completely explained by liquidity constraints.
Table 3 and 4 replicate tables 1 and 2 for the fixed effects specification. As can be seen in table 3, the
treatment effects are now significant at the 5% level in four of the populations, at the 10% level in another two
and insignificant in two populations. As the magnitudes of the point estimator are little changed, this lack of
significance seems to be mostly driven by a lack of power. This is supported by table 4 where the difference
between the treatment effects in the two subpopulations remains insignificant. Moreover, the impact of assets
on the treatment effect is still tiny.
Table 5 and 6 replicate tables 1 and 2 for the probit specification. For interpretability, table 5 cites the
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Table 3: Treatment Effect different subpopulations: Fixed Effects Model
Population Observations People Treatment Effect P>|t| 95%CI
NHNBW > Median 2,573 1,154 0.105 (0.0514) 0.041 [0.0043,0.2060]
VLA > Median 2,563 1,155 0.082 (0.0521) 0.116 [-0.0202,0.1840]
LC Classification 1 NHNBW 4,750 2,384 0.076 (0.0412) 0.066 [-0.0049,0.1566]
LC Classification 1 VLA 4,723 2,372 0.075 (0.0415) 0.067 [-0.0055,0.1573]
LC Classification 2 NHNBW 2,871 1,260 0.108 (0.0501) 0.031 [0.0100,0.2064]
LC Classification 2 VLA 2,842 1,251 0.100 (0.0504) 0.047 [0.0012,0.1988]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 2,539 1,139 0.107 (0.0516) 0.038 [0.0057,0.2083]
LC Classification 3 VLA 2,557 1,153 0.084 (0.0522) 0.108 [-0.0185,0.1862]
Table 4: Differences in Treatment Effects: Fixed Effect Model
Baseline Treatment Effect Interaction P>|t| (Interaction) 95%CI (Interaction)
NHNBW > Median 0.095 (0.0395) 0.016 (0.0261) 0.534 [-0.0349,0.0673]
VLA > Median 0.103 (0.0396) 0.002 (0.0260) 0.939 [-0.0491,0.0530]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 0.091 (0.0394) 0.022 (0.0261) 0.399 [-0.0292,0.0731]
LC Classification 3 VLA 0.103 (0.0395) 0.002 (0.0260) 0.938 [-0.0490,0.0531]
Continuous Interaction NHNBW 0.112 (0.0367) -7.02e-08 (3.14e-08) 0.026 [-1.32e-07,-8.49e-09]
Continuous Interaction VLA 0.112 (0.0367) -7.14e-08 (3.19e-08) 0.025 [-1.34e-07,-8.77e-09]
Table 5: Treatment Effect different subpopulations: Probit Model
Population Observations People Average Marginal Effect P>|z| 95%CI
Whole Pollination 5,706 2,881 0.091 (0.0294) 0.002 [0.0342,0.1496]
NHNBW > Median 2,570 1,152 0.083 (0.0396) 0.037 [0.0051,0.1602]
VLA > Median 2,560 1,153 0.070 (0.0395) 0.075 [-0.0071,0.1478]
LC Classification 1 NHNBW 4,745 2,382 0.069 (0.0320) 0.031 [0.0061,0.1315]
LC Classification 1 VLA 4,718 2,370 0.069 (0.0321) 0.031 [0.0064,0.1322]
LC Classification 2 NHNBW 2,868 1,258 0.092 (0.0384) 0.017 [0.0167,0.1672]
LC Classification 2 VLA 2,839 1,249 0.089 (0.0385) 0.021 [0.0133,0.1642]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 2,536 1,137 0.085 (0.0397) 0.032 [0.0072,0.1627]
LC Classification 3 VLA 2,554 1,151 0.070 (0.0396) 0.073 [-0.0067,0.1484]
Table 6: Differences in Treatment Effects: Probit Model
Baseline Treatment Effect Interaction P>|z| (Interaction) 95%CI (Interaction)
NHNBW > Median 0.859 (0.2703) -0.159 (0.1598) 0.319 [-0.4724,0.1540]
VLA > Median 0.923 (0.2691) -0.260 (1599) 0.105 [-0.5730,0.0539]
LC Classification 3 NHNBW 0.847 (0.2695) -0.142 (0.1591) 0.372 [-0.4538,0.1698]
LC Classification 3 VLA 0.919 (0.2688) -0.255 (0.1595) 0.111 [-0.5674,0.0582]
Continuous Interaction NHNBW 0.855 (0.2520) -9.18e-07 (3.48e-07) 0.008 [-1.60e-06,-2.35e-07]
Continuous Interaction VLA 0..854 (0.2519) -9.28e-07 (3.54e-07) 0.009 [-1.62e-06,-2.34e-07]
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average marginal effect at the median of the subpopulations wealth distribution and quotes the p values of
this marginal effect; the coefficients themselves are always significant at the same level as their corresponding
marginal effect. As 6 is intended to test the difference of the treatments the p values of the coefficients are
quoted. The results are largely comparable to the random effect model both in terms of significance level and
in terms of the magnitude of the effect.
As it points towards liquidity constraint not being the casual mechanism, I will take the approximate in-
variance of this treatment effect to restriction based on a median asset split as the stylised fact representing the
first puzzle.
4.2 Second and Third Puzzles
Figure 2 shows the difference between the SPA of 58-year-old women subject to the reform as calculated from
their date of birth and their self reported SPA. Although , at age 58 by far the largest group of individuals are
those who know their true SPA to within a year, over 40% hold beliefs that are incorrect by a year or more. I
take this fact as confirmation that the second puzzle, mistaken beliefs about pension provision, is relevant to
understanding the UK female SPA reform.
With regards to the third puzzle, those reaching their SPA between April 2005 and April 2016 could receive
a 1% increase in their subsequent weekly state pension for every five weeks they deferred. Despite this very
generous deferral option, Crawford and Tetlow (2010) find that only around 2% of individuals aged between
the SPA and 75 receiving a state pension income had deferred receipt. This is difficult to reconcile with RE as
incentives clearly indicate that most would be better off deferring.
5 Baseline Rational Expectation Model
In this section I use a model to investigate the ability of RE to match the treatment effect of being below the
SPA on labour market participation across the wealth distribution observed in section 4.1. This model is based
on O’Dea (2018) who develops an RE life-cycle model that closely matches asset and participation profiles of
older individuals in the UK. The model here, adapted from O’Dea(2018), incorporates sufficient features to
match aggregate profiles but drops some features irrelevant to the present investigation.
The model contains 4 types, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, differentiated by high or low education and having access or not
to a direct benefit (DB) pension scheme. Agents are rational expected utility maximisers who choose how much
to consume ct, how much to invest in a risk-less asset at with return r, and whether to work, dependent on
not being involuntarily unemployed. The agent, conditional on not receiving a negative unemployment shock
ut = 1, receives a stochastic income offer yt each period. Unemployment status is considered verifiable so that
only if ut = 1 can the agent claim benefit b. If the agent is not unemployed, ut = 0, she receives a stochastic
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Figure 2: Mistaken SPA Beliefs of Women Subject to the Reform at Age 58
income offer yt and accepting the offer gives them an income of yt and leisure time of lt = 1− wh. Her partner
is modelled deterministically and earns a fixed amount spouseInc each period until he reaches 65, after which
time he retires and earns the state pension p. The agent receives the same state pension, p, as her partner
once she reaches the SPA which is a parameter that is varied to mimic the UK reform. However, unlike the
partner she does not automatically retire and she receive this transfer whether she works or not. Types that
have access to a defined benefit pension can claim this at age 65 conditional on leaving work. The value of the
defined benefit pension is a function of average life time earning AIMEt. From age 60 the agent is exposed to
a stochastic survival probability st. Finally, agents value bequest through a warm glow bequest function (De
Nardi, 2004; French, 2005).
Since the impact of the state pension on retirement decisions is the focus of this working paper, it is worth
interrupting outlining the rest of the model to explain why I model the state pension as I do. Modelling the
state pension as a fixed transfer p upon reaching the SPA is incorrect in two regards: individuals can choose to
delay receipt of the state pension and the state pension does have components that are dependent both directly
and indirectly on life-time earnings. The first issue is addressed in an extension in section 7 but it left out here
as the objective in this section is to investigate the ability of RE to accommodate the first puzzle. However,
the third puzzle, that despite more the actuarially fair deferral option only ≈2% take up the option, means
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that including a deferral option would introduce another puzzle RE has trouble explaining. Hence, to give the
baseline RE model the best chance of explaining the first puzzle deferral is ignored here, but is discussed in an
extension in section 7. The lump sum transfer modelling of the state pension carried out here does capture the
essence of the basic state pension which is a fixed transfer. However, the basic state pension is reduced by a
proportional amount if individuals do not meet the minimum number of years of national insurance contributions.
Additionally, the state second pension is directly based on earnings. Further complications arise as individuals
now claiming the state pension have entitlements that were accrued under different systems, such as SERPS,
producing complex and abstruse rules (Bozio, Crawford, and Tetlow, 2010 provide a detailed history). In future
versions of this working paper I intend to deal with these complexities by following O’Dea (2018) and modelling
the state pension as a function of AIMEt which I will estimate outside the model. However, I do not believe
that this current oversimplification has significant implications for qualitative predictions of this model as the
magnitude of transfers would not be greatly affected.
So the model can be summarised as the agent solving the following problem to find policy functions for
consumption ct(at, yt, AIMEt), leisure lt(at, yt, AIMEt), and assets at+1(at, yt, AIMEt):
max
ct,lt,at+1
End∑
t=start
βtstE[u(ct, lt)] (2)
s.t ct + at = (1 + r)at−1 + yt1[lt = 1− wh] + b1[lt = 1 ∧ ut = 1] + p1[t ≥ SPA] (3)
+ spouseInc1[t < 65] + p1[t ≥ 65] + 1[lt = 1]1[t ≥ 65]db(i, AIMEt) (4)
at ≥ 0, lt|(ut = 0) ∈ {1− wh, 1}, and lt|(ut = 1) ∈ {1}
where u(ct, lt) =
(cνt l
1−ν
t )
1−γ
1− γ |alive+ θ
(at +K)
ν1−γ
1− γ |deceased (5)
Average earning evolving according to:
AIMEt =

AIMEt−1(t−1)+1[lt=1−wh]yt
t t < 65
AIMEt−1 t ≥ 65
(6)
The defined benefit pension has the functional form:
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db(AIMEt) =

db1AIMEt − db2AIME2t AIMEt < ¯AIME ≡ db12db2
db1 ¯AIME − db2 ¯AIME2 otherwise
(7)
The log income offer, yt, is the sum of a deterministic component, quadratic in age and specific to the agent’s
type, and a stochastic component:
log(yt) = δi0 + δi1t+ δi2t
2 + t (8)
where t follows an AR1 with normal error term and an initial distribution 1 ∼ N(0, σ2).
The income offer can be conceptualised as being equal to some underlying productivity which the agent
maintains during unemployment spells. The unemployment status of the agent ut evolves according to a condi-
tional markov process, where the probability of unemployment is dependent on current productivity yt and the
type of the agent.
The model starts with agents aged 52. The reasons to start agents so far into the life-cylce are, firstly, the
ELSA dataset only starts interviewing people over 50 and, secondly, the period I am interested in is around
retirement and so modelling early life-cylce behaviour would be computationally wasteful. The reason to start at
52 rather than 50 is that this is the youngest age with interviews from a large number of people some with SPA
equal to 60 and some with an SPA strictly greater than 60. The agents start life with a draw from the empirical
distribution of assets at age 52. To make sure the endogeneity of the SPA to the quantity of assets chosen by
age 52 does not bias the model I used a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to test the null that assets conditional on
distinct SPAs are drawn from the same distribution and found that the data do not reject this null. If the age
105 is reached the agent dies with certainty. From age 80 the agent no longer has the choice of working; this is
to model some of the limitation imposed by declining health.
As described, the type of the agent introduces heterogeneity into whether the agent receives a DB pension,
the earning process, and the probability of unemployment, but I do not allow for preference heterogeneity over
type. The calibrations of the earning process, the unemployment probabilities, and the curvature of the warm-
glow bequest are taken from O’Dea (2018). O’Dea (2018) estimates these processes for the same dataset as I use
but O’Dea (2018) estimates for the principal earner in the household which would predominantly be men while I
am interested in the retirement behaviour of women. There are undoubtedly differences in the male and female
earning process for these generations and in future version of this working paper I will estimate the earning
process for women in the ELSA dataset. For this reason, despite the fact I will match moments to estimate
this model, it is more qualitative and stylistic than quantitative at present. Selection is corrected for by using
the correction coefficient taken from O’Dea (2018) who implements the French correction (French, 2005). The
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Figure 3: Participation Profile
values for the level of benefits b and the state pension p are set to the 2012 levels of job seekers allowance and
the basic state pension. All prices are deflated to a common year using the RPI.
The moments used to find the parameters are the proportion of women working between 52 and 75 and the
level of household non-housing, non-business wealth (NHNBW) between the same ages. These moments are used
to find the preference parameters γ, ν, β, and θ as well as the parameters of the defined benefit pension function
db1, and db2. Solving for the DB pension parameters within the model is an unsatisfactory intermediate solution
which will be corrected in future version when data access has been granted. A subsample of ELSA has been
linked to administrative UK National Insurance data allowing a panel of earnings in each year of working life to
be obtained for the respondent. With this data I can estimate AIMEt and so estimate db1 and db2 outside of
the model.
Figures 3 and 4 show the match of the participation and asset profile which are acceptably close given the
coarseness with which the model is currently estimated (for example 30 grid points for assets). Table 7 contains
the parameter estimates. Given the qualifications mentioned above, I only give to these number to show they
are not wildly different from estimates in the literature and I have not yet calculated standard errors.
These profiles were estimated with SPA = 60 and against the moments of the pre-reform data. Once the
parameters were estimated, I re-ran the model to generate simulated data with SPA = 60, SPA = 61, and
SPA = 62 and re-ran the regression analysis from section 4 on this data. As can be seen in table 8 a significant
treatment effect of being below the SPA is observed for the whole sample but unlike the real world data this
treatment effect falls by half when we restrict to people with sufficient assets. So this rational expectation model
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Figure 4: Asset Profile
Table 7: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate
γ 2.320
ν 0.288
β 0.986
db1 0.5914
db2 -4.232E-006
θ 2.899E-002
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Table 8: Regression Analysis on RE Simulations Data
Population Observations Groups Treatment Effect P>|z|
1 36,000 1,500 0.0749 0.000
2 17,976 749 0.0303 0.174
matches the aggregate profile but fails to match the impact of the SPA on labour force participation across the
distribution: exaggerating the effect on the poor and under predicting the effect on the wealthy. In the next
section I attempt to ameliorate this issue by introducing rational inattention to the SPA.
6 Rational Inattentive Model
In this section I consider the implications that costly thought has for this retirement decision. First in subsection
6.1, I describe rational inattention and how I incorporate it into the model presented in section 5 and in subsection
6.2, I solve and analyse the model.
6.1 Incorporating Incorrect Beliefs with Rational Inattention
The second retirement puzzle this paper seeks to address is that people are consistently mistaken about their own
retirement provision (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999 & 2001; Rohwedder and Kleinjans, 2006). In particular,
women subject to the UK SPA reform are misinformed about their SPA (Crawford and Tetlow, 2010; Amin-
Smith and Crawford, 2018); for example, 41% of 58-year-old women with a SPA between 60-64 don’t know
their own SPA to within a year (Amin-Smith and Crawford, 2018). This is a difficult fact to accommodate in a
standard RE life-cycle model for two reasons: policy parameters are not stochastic and information is acquired
without cost. To address these difficulties I propose to model the SPA as stochastic and make acquisition of
information about the SPA costly using a rational inattention approach.
Making a policy parameter like the SPA a stochastic variable is unusual. In fact, to the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper to do so and this I think represents a valuable contribution in itself. Hence, treating the
SPA as stochastic requires some justification. Firstly the state pension does changes; a women born in 1954
would have had an SPA of 60 when she entered the workforce in the 1970s but this would have been changed to
65 in 1994 and subsequently to 66 in 2011. Assuming the SPA is a parameter known from entry into the labour
force is counter factual. Secondly, although the actual cost of finding out your SPA is tiny, this model is, as are
all models, a simplification from the real world where there are many more sources of uncertainty. The cost of
finding out our SPA can be conceptualised as the opportunity cost of the time spent identifying the SPA, or a
stand in for more complicated aspects of state pension entitlement not explicitly modelled. RI takes an agnostic
stance on the interpretation of attention cost which can be both a strength and a weakness of the approach.
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Hence, multiple interpretations of these cost are possible. However at a minimum they should be understood as
including the full cognitive cost of remembering and assimilating this information into future plans and should
not be interpreted as just the hassle cost of finding out your SPA. As illustration, the author has paid the hassle
cost of looking up his own SPA online but has not paid the cognitive cost of remembering this information and
so would show up in survey data as someone with a mistaken belief and could not currently use his accurate
SPA in decision making. This indicates that the full cognitive cost of remembering and assimilating information
is both the minimum model and data consistent conceptualisation of these costs.
The stochastic process I will use to model the SPA is:
SPAt+1 =

SPAt + et SPAt < 70
SPAt SPAt = 70
(9)
where et ∈ {0, 1} and et ∼ Bern(p)
When the SPA is below 70, the process is a random walk with a skewed innovation as et ∈ {0, 1}. So the SPA
either increases by one year with probability p in a given year or it stays the same. This process accommodates
the idea that in recent history governments have reformed SPA upwards but generally not downward. This
process is a parsimonious and analytically tractable model of pension reform. Although it does have some
counter factual predictions, in particular, that the SPA can increase by at most one year per year whilst many
individuals saw their SPA rise by multiple years in 1995, I believe it captures the essence of pension reform. The
restriction to SPAt ≤ 70 was partially motivated by computational considerations but can be understood as
there being some upper limit beyond which the government will not increase the SPA. It could seem unrealistic
to have a model in which the small probability of the government increasing the SPA to 103 impacted on
individual’s decisions. Without this restriction the prior probability of SPA being greater than 70 by the time
this age is reached is less than 0.02%, so this simplification should not have too large an impact whatever position
is taken on the plausibility of this upper bound.
I incorporate this stochastic SPA into the model described in section 5, so the model starts with agents aged
52 but they are understood to start working life at age 20 with a SPA of 60. The agents are imperfectly informed
of their SPA, which is explained in more detail below, and I make the assumption they are unable to acquire
additional information before the start of the model at age 52. So they start with the posterior belief that
arises from entering the workforce at age 20 believing with certainty that SPA=60 and then applying Bayesian
updating in each period given the process above. Once an agent reaches their SPA their pension cannot be
taken away from them. The probability p is estimated outside the model to match the actual SPAs of women
born between 1950 and 1954 assuming these were generated by the process in equation 9. The probability of
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the SPA increasing taken from the data by this process is 6%.
A stochastic SPA alone would not explain people being mistaken about their SPA. For this I need to
incorporate costly thought and this is modelled using the rational inattention approach pioneered by Sims (1998,
2003). This acknowledges the costly nature of thought whilst abstracting away from psychological details. In
rational inattention agents suffer a disutility cost for receiving more information as measured by the entropy of
the signal they receive about the state variables.
For ease of exposition, I will use a simplified model to explain how rational attention works in my life-cycle
setting, although later I introduce rational inattention into the full model described in section 5. In this simplified
model the only states are the income offer yt, assets at, and the stochastic SPA SPAt,
max
ct,lt,at+1
T∑
t=0
βtstE[u(ct, lt)]
s.t some constraints
In a fully rational model the agent solves for policy functions for consumption ct(at, yt, SPAt), leisure
lt(at, yt, SPAt), and assets at+1(at, yt, SPAt) to solve the problem above. In the rationally inattentive model the
agent is not able to directly observe the SPA but can only perceive a noisy signal of it Zt ∼ ft(zt|SPAt, at, yt).
She can choose the distribution of the signal and make it as precise as she likes but she receives a disutility for
receiving a more precise signal proportional to the mutual information between signal and SPA I(Zt, SPAt).
Her policy function can no longer depend on the SPA but only on her beliefs as to what her SPA is. As all
agents start with the same prior belief at age 52 their belief in period t is determined by the histories of draws of
Zt they have receive up to that point, zt. So now the agent chose Zt ∼ ft(zt|SPAt, at, yt)} and policy functions
ct(at, yt, P (SPAt|zt)), lt(at, yt, P (SPAt|zt)), and at+1(at, yt, P (SPAt|zt)) to solve:
max
ct,lt,at+1,ft
T∑
t=0
βtstE[u(ct, lt)− λI(SPAt;Zt)] (10)
s.t some constraints
The penalty for receiving a more precise signal is proportional to the mutual information I(Zt, ERAt) which
is a concept from information theory. It measures the expected reduction in uncertainty from receiving a signal,
where uncertainty is measured by entropy H(.):
I(SPAt;Zt) = H(SPAt)− EZ [H(SPAt|Zt)]
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Entropy is the central concept of information theory and is defined as H(Z) ≡ −EZ [log(fZ(Z)] where
Z ∼ fz. If the base of the logarithm is taken to be 2 then the entropy is the minimum number of bytes required
to communicate the information contained in a random variable; if the logarithm is to a different base then
entropy represents the same quantity but measured in a different unit. As such it is an easily understandable
measure of uncertainty and the most precise measure of the amount of information received by an agent.
The introduction of rational inattention greatly complicates this model for two reasons. Firstly, it introduces
a very high dimensional choice variable in ft. Since SPAt has finite support we can restrict, without loss of
generality, the support of ft to be discreet and finite. In this case, ft is a finite dimensional object but is still
very high dimensional having a dimension of Dim(SPAt)− 1. Secondly, it introduces a large and unobservable
state to the agents decision problem in the form of their posterior belief P (SPAt|zt).
For these reason, solving rational inattention models is notoriously difficult. Most approaches either make
a lot of simplifying assumptions, like quadratic utility (Maćkowiak, Matějka and Wiederholt, 2016), or use
numerical methods that assume interior solutions (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015). The method I use is from
Steiner, Stewart, and Mate˘jka (2017) (henceforth SSM) who solve a general class of dynamic discrete choice
models without additional simplifying assumptions. However, as SSM’s result is for a discreet choice model it
requires that I discretise the choice variable. As labour choice is already discreet, this only implies a need to
discretise assets. Some other minor extension and adaptations of SSM’s result were required and I explain these
in Appendix A.
Before outlining the results from SSM which I rely on to solve this model, it is convenient to introduce some
notation. Firstly, for brevity I will denote by dt the agent’s decision dt = (at+1, lt) and then I will re-express the
agent’s utility function as a function of dt and the states, Xt, by substituting out consumption via the budget
constraint to give u(dt, Xt). Secondly, let Wt denote the states that the agent freely and costlessly observes,
that is all the states except the SPA, Wt = (at, yt, AIMEt, ut). The principal result of SSM that I use to solve
this model is that the solution of a general class of dynamic discreet choice RI problems is a dynamic logit rule
(Rust, 1987) with a bias in form of default rule
pt(dt|Xt) = exp(vt(dt, Xt))∑
d′t∈D exp(vt(d
′
t, Xt))
(11)
where
vt(dt, Xt) = ut(dt, Xt) + log qt(dt|Wt) + βE[Vt+1(Xt+1)|dt, Xt]
Vt(Xt) = log(
∑
dt∈D
exp(vt(dt, Xt)))
for the default rule qt(dt|Wt) = Ext [pt(dt|Xt)|Wt].
This result differs from a standard dynamic logit only by the addition of the default rule. The default rule is
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the expected action at a point in the freely perceived state space Wt over the part of the state space that incurs
an information cost SPAt. Hence, the log qt(dt|Wt) term represents the original utility cost of information in the
solution as the more information they pay to receive the more their actions will depend upon SPAt and so the
larger log qt(dt|Wt). Taken to the extreme we can see that if the agent takes the same action in all eventualities
of SPAt, then qt(dt|Wt) = 1 and the penalty term disappears.
This is a surprising and powerful result and it is worth emphasising a couple of points about it. Firstly,
the SPAt in the vector of states Xt = (at, yt, AIMEt, ut, SPAt) is the true SPA not the agents belief or any
transformation of it. The relevant states for any agent faced with this problem would contain the posterior or
history of signal received replacing the SPAt (at, yt, AIMEt, ut, zt). SSM are able to bypass the difficulty of
having this large and unobserved state by showing that the original problem is mathematically equivalent to
a problem with observable states and then solve this equivalent problem. Hence, Xt is a computational state
vector rather than the agent’s state when faced with the problem. Secondly, the logit result is not derived by
introducing preference shocks as is normally the case. Instead, the logit results arises due to a deep mathematical
connection between the entropy and the logit distribution which has been known and exploited since the early
information theory literature (Jaynes, 1957; Shannon, 1959).
By providing this analytic solution to rationally inattentive dynamic discreet choice models, SSM solve one
of the two difficulties mentioned above: replacing the large unobserved state in the agents problem with the
observed state SPAt. However, the problem of the high dimensionality of the solution remains as pt(dt|Xt) is a
(|Supp(dt)| − 1) dimensional object and this implies a high computational cost as explained below.
Unlike in the traditional dynamic logit, the conditional choice probabilities now appear on both side of the
equation once we substitute the definition of the default rule qt into equation 11
pt(dt|Xt) = exp(ut(dt, Xt) + logE[pt(dt|Xt)|Wt] + βE[Vt+1(Xt+1)|dt, Xt])∑
d′t∈D exp(ut(d
′
t, Xt) + logE[pt(d
′
t|Xt)|Wt] + βE[Vt+1(Xt+1)|d′t, Xt])
(12)
This equation contains conditional choice probabilities for all values of dt in the denominator and all value
of SPAt in the penalty for a non-prescriptive default rule logE[pt(dt|Xt)|Wt]. Hence equation 12 defines a
fixed point and as pt is a high dimensional object this is computationally costly. I use SSM’s results to solve
the model of section 5 incorporating both rational inattention and the stochastic SPA process described in the
current section. I solve the model by backwards induction; until age 68 is reached the problem in each period is
a fully rational problem and can be solved by maximising utility. At age 68 RI begins to play a part as at ages
70 and above the agent is in receipt of the state pension with certainty and at age 69 if she has not received her
pension she knows the SPA must currently be 70. Once age 68 is reached I solve equation 12 as a fixed point
iteration for each point in the costlessly observed state space Wt and continue to apply backward induction with
this fixed point iteration replacing the UMP within the period.
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6.2 Rational Inattention Results
I apply the results and methods described in the last section to solve the RI version of the model described
in section 5. That is households who choose the distribution of the signal they will receive Zt ∼ ft and their
actions dt given costlessly observed states and their history of signal draws to solve:
max
dt,ft
finish∑
start
βtstE[u(dt, Xt)− λI(SPAt, Zt)] (13)
subject to the constraints and exogenous process outlined in equations 3-9.
I have yet to estimate this model but instead present the dynamics of the model for a value of λ, choose
to approximately match the subjective belief data, with all other parameter values taken from the estimates
of the RE model. To discipline the cost of attention using the subjective belief data I treat people’s response
to question about their SPA as the mode of their posterior distribution in the period which I solve for in the
model using the results of SSM. Treating subjective expectation response as representing the mode of a belief
distribution is a standard interpretation of such data (Juster, 1966; Manski, 1990; Blass et al. 2010, van der
Klaauw, 2012). The value of the cost of attention settled on is λ = 0.001. This cost of attention parameter
implies to be fully informed of the SPA would incur a cost per period 1.76 times larger than the life-time utility
gain to the median household of a 1% increase of consumption in all contingencies. This may seem large but
this value was chosen to approximately match the share of people who are mistaken about their own SPA by
more than a year and in fact by this metric this value of λ is slightly to large implying 71% of people correctly
know their SPA when in the data the truth is slightly less the 60%.
As can be seen in figures 5 and 6, in the aggregate profiles the most noticeable change between the RE and
the RI model is an increase in asset holding and participation amongst households below the SPA. Surprisingly
as the value of λ was arbitrary chosen, this has improved the fit as compared to the RE model. For comparability,
the RE model presented here contains a stochastic SPA, like the RI model, but, unlike the RI model, the agent
is fully informed of their own SPA. This represent an additional change to the baseline presented in section 5
beyond the discretisation needed to apply SSM. This distinction, however, is unimportant as the prediction of
the RE model with and without a stochastic SPA differ only in second and third order terms so as to be almost
indistinguishable. This does show that RI is crucial to the results obtained here, as introducing a stochastic
SPA alone produces no describable difference.
Viewed in general terms this change in the asset profile can be understood as a response to the increased
precautionary saving motive induced by RI. However the distributional details are very important. The increases
in mean asset holdings is driven by two groups. One group, very wealthy outliers whose small increase in savings
has a disproportionately large impact on the mean. The second group, the poor, for whom precautionary saving
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Figure 5: RI vs RE Labour Market Participation Profile SPA = 60:
Figure 6: RI vs RE Asset Profile SPA = 60:
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Table 9: RE vs. RI Asset Distribution Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics Assets RE Summary Statistics Assets RI
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1.00% 0 0 1.00% 0 0
5.00% 0 0 5.00% 0 0
10.00% 0 0 Obs. 36,00 10.00% 0 0 Obs. 36,00
25.00% 888.54 0 Sum of Wgt. 36,00 25.00% 1545.30 0 Sum of Wgt. 36,00
50.00% 8,418.47 Mean 43315.26 50.00% 8,418.47 Mean 43645.54
Largest Std. Dev. 161599.6 Largest Std. Dev. 161658
75.00% 26,057.28 2391046 Variance 2.61E+10 75.00% 26,057.28 2391046 Variance 2.61E+10
90.00% 82,276.21 2391046 Skewness 9.204104 90.00% 82,276.21 2391046 Skewness 9.189518
95.00% 154,702.70 2391046 Kurtosis 111.2387 95.00% 154,702.70 2391046 Kurtosis 111.0051
99.00% 6,20,312.00 2391046 99.00% 6,20,312.00 2391046
Table 10: Treatment effect RE vs RI
RE RI
Treatment p Treatment p
Whole Population 0.092 0.000 0.093 0.000
Above Median Asset in SPA-1 0.022 0.258 0.042 0.026
is more important and so increase savings by a larger proportionate amount than other groups. The impact of
this increase in saving amongst the poor can be detected in the summary statistics of the wealth distribution in
table 9.
Neither of these groups dramatically changes their participation. The very rich do not work in either models
and the poorest work in both, so the question as to what is driving the increase in participation in the RI model
remains. As can be seen from figure 7, which plots the difference in probability of participation between the
RE and RI model, the increased uncertainty from RI make some agents, whose labour market attachment is
marginal, switch their decision. As the participation is a discrete choice this can go both ways but the dominating
effect is to increase participation. Individuals with marginal participation tend to have above median assets,
hence RI increases participation amongst the top half of the asset distribution.
As the RI uncertainty is resolved upon reaching SPA this might help explain the bunching of exits at SPA
and repeating the regression used in section 6.2 we see that is indeed the case. In table 10, there is a much
smaller reduction in the treatment effect in the RI model when we restrict to those with above median assets in
the period before SPA. Although the potential for this mechanism exists with the introduction of the stochastic
SPA alone, for the empirically calibrated levels of SPA uncertainty used here, the amplification of uncertainty
by RI is crucial to generate any discernible difference.
An intuition for these results can be gleaned from considering the trade-off faced by the agents. Figure 8
displays in the top panel a schematic representation of the utility function of an agent at a point in the state
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Figure 7: Difference in Conditional Probability of Working RI-RE at age 57
space if they choose to work and if they do not. Any point on the x-axis is a choice of next periods assets with
the value increasing from right to left. This can be thought of roughly as consumption expressed in the standard
left-to-right direction although the exact consumption bundle is different for the two functions, working and
not working, as the same level of next period assets implies a higher level of consumption if you work. The
reason for having the x-axis in these terms is to accord with the bottom pane which shows expected marginal
utility next period as a function of the asset choice. This bottom pane is used to find the asset choice level that
equalise today’s marginal utility with the expected marginal utility next period. As the participation decision is
discrete, the agent then chooses which of these two optimal decisions, conditional on working status, produces
the highest utility and selects whether to work accordingly. This can be found in the top panel by comparing
which intersection point is higher. I have done this for high uncertainty, representing RI in the discussion
above, and low uncertainty, representing RE. As the utility function here displays prudence, marginal utilities
are convex and so, by Jensen’s inequality, increasing uncertainty shifts the marginal value of assets next period
upwards. In this diagram we see how this increase in uncertainty can flip the participation of an agent with
marginal labour market attachment. Here I show the case where they work under low uncertainty and don’t
under high but I could equal draw it the other way.
RI is more than the introduction of more uncertainty. It also introduces another channel for the agent to
optimise over: the precision of the signal. This channel can be understood in this diagram as the ability to
shift the expected marginal value of assets tomorrow down by reducing the uncertainty but only at the cost of
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Figure 8: Schematic Representation of the UMP facing a RI agent
also shifting the utility function down. This is the central trade-off introduced by RI but my exploration of this
channel is still very preliminary. Investigating this channel, and the informativeness of the signals chosen by
agents at different points in the state space, has implications for why people are misinformed about their SPA.
One interesting result is that, except at a handful of points, agents choose to receive very little information and
these points tend to be found in the upper half of the asset distribution. This prediction agrees with a finding
by Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) that richer people are more likely informed of their social security provision.
7 Extension
So far this work has ignored the third retirement puzzle identified: that people do not take up more than
actuarially fair option to defer pension receipt. However, rational inattention can speak very directly to this
puzzle. The calculation implying actuarial favourable deferral ignore the attention cost of an uncertain future
pension entitlement, which benefit claiming convert into certain and salient present income.
The version of the model presented in section 6, does not incorporate such a mechanism for two reason.
Firstly, the model does not include a benefit claiming decision. Secondly, the only source of uncertainty subject
to an attention cost is the SPA and once this age is reached the attention cost disappears whether the agent
claims or not. Including more sources of uncertainty subject to an attention cost would make the model more
realistic. If one of these additional source were uncertainty concerning the level of the state pension and a benefit
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claiming decision were added, then the model would include an additional incentive not to defer resulting from
cognitive costs. As long as current income is still treated as salient claiming removes the attention cost related to
the level of state pension by converting uncertainty future pension benefits into certain current income. Hence
providing an incentive not to defer which is ignored in the claims that deferral is more than actuarially fair. The
level of uncertainty in pension benefits could be estimated directly from the data outside the model as was done
in section 6 for the SPA.
8 Conclusion
This working paper offers a solution to three puzzles in the retirement literature by incorporating rational
inattention into a quantitative retirement saving model. In doing so it makes contributions beyond offering a
solution to these three puzzles. Firstly, it adds to the evidence for the first puzzle that retirement choices are
more sensitive to legislated pension ages than rational expectations can account for. It does this in the context
of the UK female state pension age reform by more carefully controlling for assets and by demonstrating that
a state-of-the-art RE model fails to match the observed treatment effect for individuals across the distribution
of assets: it exaggerates the impact of the SPA on poorer individuals whilst underestimating the impact on
wealthier agents. Secondly, the paper contributes to the rational inattention literature by being the first, to
the best of my knowledge, not only to incorporate rational inattention into a life-cycle model but also to assess
a rationally inattentive model against non-experimental individual choice data. Doing this allows the life-
cycle model to accommodate the second puzzle: that people hold mistaken beliefs about their own provisions
for retirement. Results from the RI model are preliminary but they offer some insight into the dynamics RI
introduces and indicate that RI has the potential to illuminate bunching of labour market exits at SPA as well
as people’s ignorance of their pension provision. The key mechanism behind this result is that by allowing for
uncertainty in the SPA, resolved upon reaching SPA, introduces additional precautionary saving; thus, inducing
greater labour market participation pre-SPA. Crucially, introducing reasonable levels of uncertainty about the
SPA without RI only negligible increases the sensitivity of labour force participation to the SPA. It is the
differential and endogenous amplification of this uncertainty by rational inattention that allows the model to
better match the sensitivity of labour market choices to the SPA across the wealth distribution. The approach
taken to discipline the cost of attention introduced in the RI model is to use subjective expectations data and,
to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use the techniques of subjective expectations literature to
discipline attention costs in a rational inattentive model. Finally, the paper propose an extension of the main
model with a mechanism to explain the third puzzle for a rational expectations explanation of retirement: that
people do not take up more that actuarially advantageous deferral options. The insight offer by this extension
is that assertions that deferral is actuarially advantageous omit attention cost which can be avoid by claiming,
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hence omit an incentive not to defer.
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A Extending Steiner, Stewart, and Matejka (2017) and Mapping to Model
In this section I adopt much of the notation of SSM and notation is not related to the rest of the paper.
My variant of their setup is the following. There is a payoff relevant exogenously evolving state θt ∈ Θt
according to measure pi ∈ ∆(∏t θt) and agents must make a payoff relevant decision from a choice set Dt.
Before making a decision, the agent first observes a costless signal yt ∈ Yt , yt ∼ gt(yt|θt, yt−1) and then can
choose any costly signal about θt on signal space Xt. Agents get gross flow utilities u(dt, θt) that can depend
on the whole history of state and actions but suffer a utility cost for more precise information ∝ I(θt, xt|zt−1)
where zt = (xt, yt+1). It is assumed that yt+1 ⊥ (xt, dt)|(θt, yt). The sets Θt, Dt,Yt, and Xt are finite and that
|Dt| ≤ |Xt|. My setup differs from SSM’s in that I adapt the timing assumption so that the costless signal is
received before the action is taken each period rather than after it. This change in timing only affects the proof
of lemma 1 from SSM’s paper and I show below that this results still holds using a slightly different strategy to
prove it.
The agent chooses information strategy ft(xt|θt, zt−1) and action strategies dt = σt(zt−1, xt), collectively
referred to as their strategy st = (ft, σt) to solve
max
f,σ
E[
T∑
t=0
βt(u(σt(z
t−1, xt), θt)− I(θt, xt|zt−1)] (14)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution over sequences (θt, zt) induced by the prior
pi together with the strategy st = (ft, σt) and the distributions gt of costless signals. The function u(., .) is
assumed continuous. For notational convenience, let ωt = (θt, zt−1) be the current state and the agents current
decision node, or information about the state, then:
Proposition 1. (Lemma 1 in SSM) Any strategy st solving the dynamic RI problem generates a choice rule
pt(dt|ωt) solving
max
p
E[
T∑
t=0
βt(u(dt, θt)− I(θt, dt|zt−1)] (15)
where we redefine zt−1 = (dt−1, yt) the expectation is with respect to the distribution over sequences (θt, zt)
induced by p, the prior pi, and the distributions g. Conversely, any choice rule p solving 15 induces a strategy
solving the dynamic RI problem.
Proof. We precede in steps.
Step 1:First note that for random variable ζt ∈ {xt, bt}
E[
∞∑
t=1
βtI(θt, ζt|zt−1)] = E[
∞∑
t=?
βt(H(θt|ζt−1, yt)−H(θt|ζt, yt))] (16)
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But then by the entropic chain rule and that θt ⊥ ζt−1|θt−1
H(θt|ζt−1, yt) = H(θt−1|ζt−1, yt) +H(θt|θt−1, ζt−1, yt)
= H(θt−1|ζt−1, yt) +H(θt|θt−1, yt)
Also yt+1 ⊥ (xt, bt)|(θt, yt) ⇒ H(yt+1|θt, xt, yt) = H(yt+1|θt, yt) = H(yt+1|θt, bt, yt), so by symmetry of
mutual information
H(θt|ζt, yt)−H(θt|ζt, yt+1) = I(θt; yt+1|ζt, yt) = I(yt+1; θt|ζt, yt)
= H(yt+1|ζt, yt)−H(yt+1|θt, ζt, yt) = H(yt+1|ζt, yt)−H(yt+1|θt, yt)
So 16 becomes
E[
∞∑
t=1
βt(H(θt−1|ζt−1, yt)−H(θt|ζt, yt+1)−H(yt|ζt, yt) +H(yt|θt, yt−1) +H(θt|θt−1, yt))]
= E[
∞∑
t=1
(βt+1 − βt)H(θt|ζt, yt+1)− βtH(yt|ζt, yt) + βt(H(yt|θt, yt−1) +H(θt|θt−1, yt))]
Step 2: Given strategy s and the choice rule generated by it p by construction they generate the same gross
utilities. Hence by step 1, 15-14 is:
E[
∞∑
t=1
(βt − βt+1)(H(θt|bt, yt+1)−H(θt|xt, yt+1)) + βt(H(yt+1|bt, yt)−H(yt+1|xt, yt))]
But then |B| ≤ |X| < ∞ ⇒ bt is measurable wrt xt and hence E[H(θt|bt, yt+1)] ≥ E[H(θt|xt, yt+1)] and
E[H(yt+1|bt, yt)] ≥ E[H(yt+1|xt, yt)] and therefore 15≥14 .
Step 3: As B ⊂ X if p is a probability choice rule then ft(xt|wt) = pt(bt|ωt) and xt = σt(zt−1, xt) is a
viable solution to 14. For this strategy generated by this mapping, the probability choice rule makes equa-
tion15=equation14
Step 4: If s solves 14 the corresponding PCR p must solve 15, as by step 2 the value from p in 15≥s in 14,
so if p doesn’t solve 15 ∃ PCR producing greater net lifetime utiltiy than s in 14. But by step 3 this produces
a viable solution to 14 with greater net life-time utility contradicting s being a solution to 14.
Step 5: If p solve 15 then by step 3 it produces a viable solution to 14 but then 15≥14 so this strategy must
be the optimal solution to 14
The remainder of the proof follow as stated in SSM for the case where the choice variables are discrete as is
the case in this paper.
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It is worth saying a few words about how the model in this paper maps to the class of models in this
appendix based on SSM as the correspondence is not obvious. The clearest difference between the SSM setup
and the model presented in section 6 is that SSM only allow for exogenous states whilst I have an endogenous
state in the form of assets at. However, since utility can depend upon the entire history of choices and states
there is a simple mapping from the endogenous states without history dependent preferences to the world of
exogenous states with history dependent preferences. The state in the sense of SSM now only contains the
exogenous states Θt = Supp(SPA) × Supp(Yt) × Supp(AIMEt), (SPAt, yt, ut) = θt ∈ Θt but since at ∈ dt−1
and AIMEt = g(dt−1, θt−1) for the function g that follows from the definition of AIMEt given in section 5.
Hence, we can re-express the the utility given in terms of section 6 states Xt and the current decision u(dt, Xt)
in terms of the history of exogenous state θt and the history of decisions u(dt, θt). And since the SSM agent
condition their action on everything useful from zt−1 = (dt−1, yt), they can condition on all states.
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